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# FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 37 NUMBER 24

## Internal Struggle in Lebanon

by Emil Lengyel

The landing of American Marines on the beaches of Beirut on July 14 focused anxious attention on the problems of Lebanon. Then on July 31 the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies elected General Fuad Chehab president of the republic. The question now is whether this election will end the internal strife in this small, hitherto pro-Western, country.

The Lebanese revolution began when an Opposition group charged that President Camille Chamoun was seeking re-election for a second six-year term, in contravention of the constitution. Chamoun, in turn, accused the revolutionaries of being in league with President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic. Chamoun's government charged the UAR with "massive, unprovoked and illegal intervention," alleging that some 3,000 Egyptians, Syrians and Palestinians, armed by Nasser, had infiltrated Lebanon.

The Lebanese government took its case to the United Nations Security Council, which dispatched an observer team of 138 trained military personnel into the area to report. The team issued its first report on July 4, stating that "it has not been possible to establish where these arms were acquired. Nor was it

possible to establish if any of the armed men observed had infiltrated from outside; there is little doubt, however, that the vast majority [of the Opposition] was in any case composed of Lebanese."

Lebanon's malaise is due, mainly, to basic anomalies in a country of some 3,400 square miles, with a population of about 1.5 million, in one of the most strategic areas of the Eastern Mediterranean. While in all other Arab countries Islam is preponderant, in Lebanon the Christians have a numerical edge over the Muslims, and the mountains have been sanctuaries of deviant Islamic creeds.

Seats in the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies are allotted on a sectarian basis, and in the distribution of government executive offices there is a gentlemen's agreement among the sects. The president is always a Maronite; Chamoun, the outgoing one, and Chehab, the incoming one, are both of this sect. The prime minister is always a Sunni Muslim—the latest being Sami es-Solh. The foreign minister, now Charles Malik, is Greek Orthodox; the minister of defense, a Druse; the speaker of Parliament, a Shiite.

Strife among the religious groups has high-

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erto been absent in Lebanon, nor has it been directly evident in the current conflict. The Maronite patriarch, Paul Meouchi, highest dignitary of the church, came out against the Maronite president of the Republic, while Muslims came out against their coreligionist premier. But the second-largest city in the country, Tripoli, with its predominantly Muslim population (represented in Parliament by three Sunni Muslims and one Greek Orthodox) has long wanted to secede from Lebanon and accede to Muslim Syria. The Lebanese army under President-elect Chehab played an inconsequential role in the revolution, because the general may have been apprehensive about arousing sectarian communalism. In the army the Muslims are a minority, in the revolution, a majority. Most of the revolutionary leaders are not Christians.

### Position of Christians

The Lebanese Christian's position is anomalous. He is an Arab, which means that he follows a way of life derived from historic memories and Islam's holy Koran. But the Koran is not the Christian Arab's holy script, and his historic memories are the reverse of his Muslim neighbors. Before the Christian became Arabized, he fought Islam. The Lebanese Christian dreads being engulfed in Pan-Arabia and turns to the West for security. By contrast, many of his Muslim fellow countrymen feel attached to the United Arab Republic, which promises a glorious future to the Arabs. Lebanese Christians also

carry greater economic, cultural and political weight than the Muslims.

The question of personalities has been linked with this issue between Muslims and Christians. The principal leaders of the Opposition have been Muslims except for one Druse. The leader of the Druses is Kamal Jumblatt, master of the feudal castle of Moukhtara, descendant of one of the historic dynasties of the mountain sect, who was educated at the Sorbonne. This scion of a feudal house is a Socialist, who divided part of his domain among his tenants. He denounced the Chamoun regime as "capitalistic-feudalistic" because of its alleged disregard of the poor.

Among the other leaders of the revolution, Saeb Salaam is a wealthy man, linked with aviation, who occupies a fortresslike Beirut mansion. Another leader, Abdullah Yaffi, holder of a Ph.D. and predecessor of Sami es-Solh, is an able politician, who has headed several cabinets. Still another prominent leader is Charles Helou, former ambassador to Rome, an acrimonious critic of Malik, whom he has described as more American than Arab. All these leaders were defeated in the June 1957 elections, which they denounced as rigged.

Outgoing President Chamoun is a member of the historic land-owning class, a former minister of interior (he could not serve as premier because of his religion), ex-lawyer and journalist. Sami es-Solh was a stormy petrel in his youth, known as "leader of the streets." A lawyer, he has served as the premier of several cabi-

nets. Chehab is a scion of a leading family which renounced Islam and embraced Christianity some 200 years ago. As chief of staff of Lebanon's small army, he managed to stay outside of party politics.

### Impact of World Politics

International politics has much to do with the Lebanese revolution. Lebanon was the only Arab country to accept the "Eisenhower Doctrine" of United States economic and military assistance to Middle East nations against international communism. Lebanon did not sever diplomatic links with France and Britain during the 1956 Suez crisis. Because of the port of Beirut and its oil pipeline terminals, Lebanon occupies a strategic position. The Chamoun government was determined to side with the West.

What about the orientation of the opposition leaders? They have been cautious when speaking about Cairo and have never advocated a pro-Moscow orientation. Jumblatt dislikes Nasser. Some of the other leaders have spoken vaguely about fusion with the United Arab Republic, but not about a union. One of them, Charles Helou, has favored a "third force" position.

It is possible that the invitation to American troops to move into Lebanon, extended by the Maronite president, may be the starting point of a communal strife. Now it seems to be clear that many Lebanese Christians—especially their "power elite"—even though self-assertively Arabs,

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## Foreign Policy Review Slated

There is so much wrong with the world these days that the United States is in for a very exhaustive, critical and possibly politically explosive examination of just what is wrong and how it got that way.

This examination has been brewing for months. Its public promoters are the Democrats in Congress, particularly the Democrats on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. As ex-Rhodes scholar, ex-university president, Senator J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, put it in an opening burst of criticism: United States foreign policy is "inadequate, outmoded and misdirected. . . . It is based in part on a false conception of our real, long-term national interests and in part on an erroneous appraisal of the state of the world in which we live. Worse, it reflects a dangerous apathy and a quite incomprehensible unwillingness to look facts in the face. . . ."

### Criticism Growing

This outburst came prior to President Eisenhower's speech before the United Nations General Assembly on August 13, which was praised by Democratic Senators Wayne Morse of Oregon and Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, among others, who have also been critical of United States foreign policy as conducted by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and presumably with the President's full approval.

It is not only the Democrats, but also influential Republicans and private citizens who are coming to feel that something is wrong with American foreign policy and/or its executions. They want an investigation ranging over many problems.

They are going to get it. They will get it in a congressional investigation, possibly two investigations (one by each house). And they will get it in the newspapers of the country, in editorials and in the "letters to the editor" columns. For the present grumbling over American foreign policy is growing in breadth and depth. It has political overtones, obviously. There is an election next November, and no congressman can forget that. But it would be both fallacious and sophomoric for the Administration to take the attitude that the mounting criticism of its foreign policy or the conduct of that policy is largely and primarily politically motivated.

All the critics of President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles are not as bitter or gloomy as Joseph Alsop, or as disillusioned with Eisenhower's capacities and abilities as Walter Lippmann, but many feel in their bones that the President and Mr. Dulles have somehow failed to protect and advance American interests and policies to the extent possible. They are not primarily looking for a scapegoat, but for an explanation, a study that will show what we should do that we have not done, and what we have done that we should not have done. And they are not going to be satisfied with the argument that it is all the Kremlin's fault. Senator Fulbright pinpointed that attitude when he asserted that if there is one single factor that explains our present predicament, "it is our readiness to use the specter of Soviet communism as a cloak for the failure of our own leadership."

Few observers in the capital believe that personality changes of

those at the top in charge of the conduct of foreign policy will be made. No one, for example, thinks that Mr. Dulles will be replaced at present. As is well known, President Eisenhower's support for Secretary Dulles is as great as that given by President Harry S. Truman to Secretary Dean Acheson when the latter was under fire. Nor is it likely that clearly announced changes in policy will be forthcoming, since that would be an admission of inadequate or downright harmful policy in the past. But changes are in the wind, nonetheless, though when and if they come they will be explained as policy redefinitions, policy implementations or policy adaptations to events.

### Need for Changes

There is obvious need for new policies or "policy redefinitions" for the Middle East, Latin America, the Far East, and on many other problems. New United States policies will doubtless emerge on Latin America, as we will deal with that area in a forthcoming conference of American states.

The President's proposals for a UN peace force in the Middle East and a call for economic development of Arab lands, to be directed by them with outside support and including that of the United States, also points toward new policy evolution. The congressional studies will also play their part in reframing foreign policy, just as will events and growing public dissatisfaction with the way the world is moving. It will become a really hot political issue only if the Administration resists evolution in foreign policy.

NEAL STANFORD



## Can We Understand the Middle East?

The summoning of the United Nations General Assembly, instead of a summit conference within the UN on the Middle East, gave the United States a challenging opportunity to reappraise its policy in that turbulent area. And this Washington appears to have undertaken, judged in the light of President Eisenhower's declaration of support for Arab nationalism in his August 6 press conference, and even more, in his comprehensive plan presented to the General Assembly on August 13 for measures to stabilize peace in the area and set the Arab nations on the road to broad-scale economic development.

This approach reflects a new attitude toward the Arabs. Hitherto, in the debate about a Middle East summit conference, one of the fundamental questions which had emerged was, Which of the two great powers, the United States or the U.S.S.R., most clearly understands what is going on in the Middle East?

Despite our distinguished corps of foreign correspondents serving the news media of a free country, despite the resources of the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, it was frankly admitted in Washington that we were caught by surprise when the Iraq coup took place on July 14.

Had this been an isolated incident, there would have been no serious cause for concern. Every nation, great or small, makes mistakes. But it has long been clear that over the past decade we have not understood the reaction of the Arabs toward the creation of the state of Israel, the motives that have inspired Arab nationalism or the economic aspirations of the Arabs. In short, except for a

few perceptive and experienced experts, in Congress or outside, who, so far as can be judged by events, did not receive a hearing in government circles, the Middle East was for us a *terra incognita*.

Why did we not understand the Middle East? And, if the Russians did better on this score, why?

### Two Reasons for Failure

There seem to be two reasons for our apparent failure to appraise the situation correctly. First, often lacking the necessary grounding in geography, history, languages and literature, most Americans were, in effect, strangers to the Middle East, even if they had been there. And second, even some of the experts so intensely disliked what they saw—the rise of Nasser, the rapid drift toward Arab nationalism, the peril of Arab-Israeli conflicts—that they developed a psychological block, and rejected realities as impossible, and therefore incredible. By contrast, the Russians took pains to learn the languages, the fears, the aspirations of the Middle East. What is more important, what they saw happening there did not displease them. Unlike us, they did not confuse Arab nationalism with communism, but welcomed it for what it is—a passionate desire for independence from Western rule.

This desire, at least for the time being, fitted into the objectives of the U.S.S.R.—but it could also have fitted into ours, if we had assessed it properly.

Because of limited knowledge, we long neglected the consequences of Arab nationalism. Yet if we would only take the trouble to understand nationalist sentiment in the Middle

East we might find a key to the problems of other underdeveloped areas which often remain a mystery to us.

This sentiment is, first, an explosive mixture of a profound desire to be left alone by all the great powers and of anti-Westernism, formerly directed against Britain and France, but embracing us as well now that the United States is the ally of the Western powers in NATO. The Arabs are willing and eager to obtain aid from the United States and other Western nations, but they want to fit such aid into the framework of their own plans and be free to seek aid from other nations as well, including the U.S.S.R.

Second, the Arabs want to control and administer their own resources—not just to receive revenue on them from foreign owners, no matter how generous their terms may be. The principal resources of the Middle East are the Suez Canal, whose nationalization was finally accepted by foreign stockholders in a financial settlement made at Geneva on July 13; the oil fields of Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf sheikdoms; and the oil pipelines which pass through Syria and Lebanon. In terms of resources, however, the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) is a "have not" country, except for revenue from the Suez Canal and use of the pipelines. The "have" areas are the oil-owning countries. Unification of the Arab lands, which Nasser seeks and symbolizes, would, in the opinion of many observers, make possible the effective economic development of the area as a whole, now divided up into small states, some of which,

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## The Rule of Law in the Space Age

by Andrew G. Haley

Mr. Haley, a member of the Washington law firm of Haley, Wollenberg and Kenahan and a rocketry expert, is president of the International Astronautical Federation, general counsel of the American Rocket Society and author of numerous articles on space law.

The satellites which at this moment are circling the earth are the heralds of a new age for mankind—the Age of Space. Within the next 25 years man's occupation of space will extend to the use of recoverable satellites at distances of as much as 22,000 miles from earth, carrying payloads of many thousands of pounds. Lunar instrumented probes will also be in use, as will instrumented comets for interplanetary, planetary and solar research in the region from Venus to Mars. Man himself will venture, during this period, into terrestrial space in small inhabitable earth satellites of four- to perhaps ten-person capacity.

The legal problems which will arise in connection with space travel will be more complicated than and in many respects entirely different from those which faced civilization when it abandoned God's wind for the steamship and when it took to flight in the air. Thus it is important that the lawyer engaged in the formulation of these rules of a "different realm" take care not to attempt to apply to events in space, rules which have meaning only when applied to terrestrial events.

An illustration may help to indicate the difference in scope between the law which has been developed to solve the problems of the past and the new law needed to cope with problems presented by space travel.

### Who May Leave the Earth?

Who may leave the earth to travel in space? The analogies derived from present law are of little assistance. Any discussion of the legality of re-

stricting the freedom of human beings to leave their countries necessitates an understanding of the nature of the individual's "right" to depart from such confines. Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), the father of international law, taught that in the absence of an express prohibition, or a custom to the contrary having the force of a convention, the right to emigrate could be fully and freely exercised. He asserted that whoever submits to a government does so solely for his own good, and based the rule of freedom of emigration on the natural obligation of preserving oneself. Samuel Freiherr von Pufendorf (1632-94), another great international law expert, held that members of a society ought to be permitted to go anywhere they wished if by doing so they could improve their lives.

While authorities on law are divided on the question of a king's right in the earliest days of common law to restrain a subject from leaving the realm, the fact remains that travel abroad was one of the activities carefully supervised in early times to prevent subjects from becoming "infected" with foreign and new, and hence presumably dangerous, ideas. This policy was implemented by resort to the writ of *ne exeat regno* by which the king commanded a subject not to go out of the realm. The writ, under one name or another, is used in many countries at this time, but is generally restricted to cases of equitable debts and claims. An early English law proscribed the sending of children out of the country for the purposes of attending Catholic semi-

naries. This law was subsequently broadened to prohibit Catholics from leaving for any purpose.

The doctrine of free egress was brought to the United States by the colonists, who adhered to the theory of Sir William Blackstone (1723-80) that English subjects had the right to come and go as they pleased unless a royal injunction had been issued against them. While the Constitution of the United States says nothing explicit about the right of United States citizens to leave the country, the Supreme Court, in a recent decision, held that in the absence of statutory authorization the government could not deny a citizen his right to a passport.

### Who May Not Leave?

Who then should be denied egress to space? If we are to avoid the result that each man's right to enter space is subject to the municipal law of his nation or to some form of "international" rule which incorporates these municipal rules, we must devise norms which take into consideration the needs of man and the realities of space flight. If an individual is to be denied entrance to space, the justification of the denial should be based on some fact relating to the nature of space travel and the character and identity of the individual. Municipal considerations of a state's internal policy should not govern, for it must be understood that the limitations on the right of an individual to leave his community or nation are not identical with his right to enter space. A man may be completely free to leave

the confines of his state and at the same time not free to leave the earth.

Paradoxically, the first to be excluded should be those who would exclude others for any political reason, because their moral make-up obviously would be inimical to the concepts of fundamental justice on which space law must be founded. We should also exclude the "nefarious" (or impiously wicked), according to the original Roman law meaning of the word. As the welfare and happiness of all passengers must be of paramount importance, the ultimate decision as to who might be included in the complement of any particular voyage should undoubtedly rest with the passengers as a body.

Another basis for restraining those who may explore space, at least in the beginning, might well depend on the purpose of the emigration. Thus permission might initially be granted only to space technicians, much in the same manner as permission to travel to areas where war or unrest prevails is currently restricted to specified categories of persons such as reporters, nurses, and so on. Also, travelers in Europe immediately after the war were restricted, due to the shortage of food and the overtaxing of transportation facilities. For a while it may be necessary to limit travel to planets for similar reasons—that is, shortage of transport, oxygen and food.

### **Use of Air Space**

The world must also arrive at a new and uniform set of legal principles about the use of air space by earth satellites. The launching by the United States and the U.S.S.R. of earth-orbiting unmanned satellites in connection with the International Geophysical Year is legally possible for the sole reason that no nation has voiced objections, although the satellites in describing their orbits may violate the municipal law of half a

dozen nations. Indeed, the International Civil Aviation Convention forbids the unauthorized passage of pilotless aircraft "over the territory of a contracting state."

Modern legal writers, largely influenced by Grotius, regard international law as nothing more than positive law, that is, law enacted by a government for the regulation of a society. In other words, the present-day concept of international law recognizes only those rules of law adopted by governments, which are accepted by the judges of courts of justice, and which are applied by them in deciding cases. As Green Haywood Hackworth, an American authority on international law says, international law possesses the characteristics "common to municipal law." His meaning is illustrated by the law governing the air space of the earth. That law is based solely on each nation's absolute right of sovereignty over the space above its territory, a concept completely repugnant to the nature of space.

### **Law of Nature Useful**

In searching among the traditional philosophies of law for one more favorable to unrestricted space travel we must look to the writings of those publicists of the 15th and 16th centuries who believed that international law should come from the law of nature. The present pertinence of the "natural theory" of international law is all the greater when we consider that it received its most searching examination at another time when man was faced with the discovery of a new world. Natural law is not intangible and nonexistent, as followers of the positive school of law insist. It is not imposed by a sovereign or a legislature; it grew up before either existed. It does not exist in code form and has never existed in statutory form.

The Spanish scholar Francisco de

Vitoria (1480-1546) extended the principles of natural law and applied them to international law as a basis of cooperation in the world community. He was motivated to a great degree by the reports sifting back to Spain of the conditions in the New World and the shamefully bad treatment accorded the natives by Spanish adventurers interested only in gain. The success of the adventurers would have meant annihilation of the Indians. With this need, then, for a law to govern a nation's actions in new territory and in relation to other nations, Vitoria set forth his principles of international law.

These principles were further extended by another Spaniard, Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). He accepted the basic tenets of Vitoria's work, but Suárez, like Vitoria, envisioned an international community composed of independent, perfect states bound by "a certain unity," with each "a member in a certain fashion of this universe, so far as it concerns the human race." Such an international community was an outgrowth of state government, based on the natural impulse of man toward social relationships, urging them to unite. This concept furnished the basis for the more impressive international community envisioned by Vitoria and Suárez, founded on the same basic precept.

Wars, colonialism and strong nationalism throughout the world have overwhelmed the sound basis of international law for which Vitoria and others argued in their time. Although phases of the law of nature and some principles of equity and morality are infused into it, international law today is largely the self-serving municipal law of individual nations.

Natural law, Aristotle said, "... is that which has the same authority everywhere, and is independent of opinion." This is virtually the an-

tithesis of international law. Since what is needed, above all, in evolving rules of conduct for the new frontier in space; is a set of principles which are beyond terrestrial disagreement, it is evident that our space jurisprudence must be based on something other than present-day international law.

The most unfortunate development in connection with the orderly statement of space law is that in 1957 it became involved in the proceedings of the United Nations Subcommittee on Disarmament in London. This may have been inevitable because the question of control of objects entering outer space was bound to arise. However, it is regrettable that the problems of space law received this first and most critical examination in the intense political atmosphere of the London Disarmament Conference. But the problems will mount inexorably, and the community of nations will be forced to take steps to create a body of space law.

### Need for a Space Authority

At first we may hope only for an international agency authorized to promulgate uniform regulations relating to take-off and landing procedures, and to the general safety of the people of the earth. Initially, space vehicles will be owned by nations or groups of nations, and extension of international regulation will be fought jealously. But gradually traffic will increase, new propulsive systems will be found which will reduce the cost of construction and operation, commercial enterprise will demand access to space, emigration will start, meteorite mining will become an industrial objective, and all the ancient problems of law will be reasserted under vastly more complicated circumstances.

Again there will arise, but in a new frame of reference, problems of neutrality and belligerency, of na-

tionality, domicile, statelessness, internment, asylum, sequestration, blockade, hovering, extraterritoriality, embargo, reprisal, boycotts, expropriation, piracy, contraband, customs, prize proceedings, emigration, immigration, mandates, colonies, tortious violations, civil claims, venue, jurisdiction, and so on.

In time there must be created on earth an independent and sovereign authority of which every human being would be a citizen by virtue of his existence, and to which all nations would surrender their sovereignty to the extent that none of them could own or operate a space vehicle without a license from such an authority, and would agree to conform with its regulations. In no case could a license be unreasonably withheld. Private citizens and concerns would be eligible for similar licenses. The board administering the authority would be constituted on the fairest basis then known to mankind.

The authority would have the power and resources in space, in co-operation with lunar and other planetary authorities, to contain violence and to administer and enforce regulations relating to safety, sanitation, health, asylum, equipment, navigation, emigration and immigration. All of these regulations would conform to the most universal and enlightened principles of freedom and the use of property, and the authority would promulgate a code defining public and private liability for damage. The regulations would be interpreted and justice would be administered by a court constituted within the authority but answerable only to itself.

The authority would provide positive safeguards for the protection of the inhabitants of other worlds, the basic principle being that there may be no visitation whatsoever of any inhabited area until intelligible contact had been made, and the authori-

ty was satisfied that no physical or psychological hazard existed to either the explorer or the explored.

The jurisdiction of the authority would extend over the surface of the earth and over earth spaceships while maneuvering in free space. Although it should be noted that as early as the 17th century Britons and Germans talked about colonizing the moon, under this international authority such colonialism would be forbidden from the outset and the lunar and planetary communities would be independent. Thus would be projected into space free and enlightened groups of human beings, spiritually conditioned to face the problems of carving out new living space from new land.

READING SUGGESTIONS: Werner Buckeler, *To Other Worlds* (London, Burke, 1954); Walter Dornberger, *V-2* (New York, Viking, 1954); Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferté, *Rocket* (New York, Philosophical Library, 1958); Lloyd Mallan, *Men, Rockets and Space Rats* (New York, Messner, 1955).

## FPA Bookshelf

### BRITAIN

*The Organization of British Central Government 1914-1956*, by F. M. G. Willson (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1957, 32s.)

Such a detailed survey of the British government, which was carried out by a Study Group of the Royal Institute of Public Administration, has not been undertaken since the Haldane Committee report of 1918. The radical changes in government structure since then are described and analyzed, and the factors influencing those changes, discussed.

*The Life and Work of Harriet Martineau*, by Vera Wheatley (Fair Lawn, New Jersey, Essential Books, 1957, \$8.00) is a lively biography about a noted Victorian journalist and political economist whose *Political Economy Tales* and other writings caused a sensation in her time. The book not only describes a remarkable woman, but gives insight into life in 19th-century England.

Britain's dollar problem is not the result of inadequate economic policies in that country, says Elliot Zupnick, City College professor, in his book on *Britain's Postwar Dollar Problem* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1957, \$5.50). Revision of American commercial policies and an increase in American foreign investments, as well as the adoption of new policies in the sterling area, could help solve the dollar problem, he asserts.

## Lengyel

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are beset by the fear of their country being engulfed in a Muslim united Arabia. Nasser said in Damascus earlier this year that it was in his country's interest to keep Lebanon independent. However, his radio, Voice of the Arabs, has been stirring up Lebanese discontent around the clock. At the same time, the rest of the Arabs in the Middle East appear to be convinced that only the United Arab Republic can tackle their problems with some hope of success, and this belief has now waxed into a dogma. In the face of this duality of views, it is not likely that Lebanon will be an oasis of peace. Also, bayonets, even in the protective hands of friends, have never promised a comfortable seat, and it is not likely that there will be an exception to this rule in Lebanon.

Professor Emil Lengyel of New York University is the author of the books, *World Without End: The Middle East* (Day, 1953); *Egypt's Role in World Affairs* (Public Affairs Press, 1957); and of the forthcoming Oxford Book Company pamphlet, "The Changing Middle East."

## Spotlight

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notably Jordan, were artificially created by the British following World War I.

And, third, the pro-Nasser leaders, many of whom come from the lower middle class, often from the army,

are, by our standards, radicals. They want to overthrow monarchs, emirs and sheiks who own great wealth but, except in Iraq, have been slow to share it with their people. These rulers would like to maintain the *status quo*, but some of them accept the prospect that the revolutionary leaders will win and are ready to work with them.

## Possible Remedies

Hitherto, we have acted on two assumptions: Russia could be barred from the Middle East; and the Arabs would always consider Western interests equally as important as their own. Yet experienced observers have long pointed out that Russia, under any government, would expect to play a rôle in the Middle East, which adjoins its territory; and now we find that we must negotiate with the Russians if we are to succeed in neutralizing Lebanon or Jordan, or establishing an arms embargo. We also begin to see that, while the Arab countries are willing to respect Western interests—as Egypt has done with passage through Suez, and Iraq with the protection of oil fields—because these are also their interests, they want to make up their own minds about their future. It is significant that our World War II enemies—Germany, Italy and Japan, not noted during that war for their sensitivity for other peoples' feelings—appear to be

more aware of Arab desires than ourselves. They now offer to play a part in the economic development of the Middle East on terms more generous to the Arabs in some cases than those offered by the Western powers.

How can we overcome our lack of understanding, which has suddenly become a genuine threat to our security and well-being in a fast-changing world?

Much has recently been said derogatively about United States education as compared with that of the U.S.S.R.—although the critics often fail to define the objectives of the two nations. While placing emphasis on the urgent need to produce scientists, it would be well for us also to allot more money and greater mental powers to the task of learning more than we do today about the peoples, not only of the Middle East, but of the entire non-Western world—and not only in our colleges, but, more important, in our elementary and secondary schools. Otherwise, whatever we do or fail to do with armaments or economic aid, we may find ourselves in the role of King Canute, bypassed by a tide we were futilely trying to hold back. And "indirect aggression" will continue, not just because Russia or Egypt intervene in Arab affairs, but because Arabs, discontented with their lot, seek aid and comfort from outside.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

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